Explained: What’s Behind The Conflict In Ukraine?
The Russian military build-up on Ukraine’s borders was not the first; Russia had previously mobilized its forces on the Ukrainian border during the past year, in the process of pressure to achieve a Russian demand not to accept Ukraine’s joining the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and to remove the latter’s forces from the western Russian borders. Behind the Russian move were geopolitical considerations, the protection of Russian national security, and geostrategic, breaking Western hegemony by changing the international system.
The Location of Ukraine and its Importance to Russia
Ukraine emerged as an independent state after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 and, due to its location and population (46 million people), occupied an important position in the Warsaw Pact, including participating in the division of labor in the field of nuclear missiles, and the deployment of a network of ballistic missiles carrying nuclear warheads on Its lands, not to mention deep historical ties with Russia: the birth of the Russian nation and the Orthodox Church, which became the Russian national church after the latter’s conversion to Christianity, in Ukraine, near the port of Sevastopol in the Crimea, says the Russian legend, Prince Vladimir was baptized in 988, in the first steps to enter Christianity to this country. The Russian conquest of Crimea in 1773 represented a significant development in the fate of Russia, which for the first time had a port in warm waters and a fleet near the Mediterranean.
The power equation between Russia and Ukraine changed due to the transformation and change in Russia and its expansion at the expense of the neighboring peoples. Still, their relationship remained strong, as Russia had a significant influence over it, whether at the level of influential people or institutions. But its most reliable and robust base was represented by the Russian minority, which amounts to 17.3% of the population, and is concentrated in the Crimea and the eastern regions bordering Russia. Industrial, family-oriented Prussia across the border, for decades, perhaps centuries.
Russia has been and is still keen to consolidate this influence and build a stable and lasting political relationship with Ukraine, whether at the level of bilateral relations or within the framework of the Eurasian Union, which Russian President Vladimir Putin envisioned Ukraine would be its cornerstone. Without Ukraine, the Eurasian Union loses its meaning entirely, due to the tremendous geostrategic importance of Ukraine, as Russia’s easy passage to Western Europe. Zbigniew Brzezinski, US National Security Adviser in the administration of President Jimmy Carter 1977–1981, said, “Without Ukraine, there would be no Russia is a superpower.” For the Russian president, Ukraine falls within the scope of the “near neighborhood” diplomacy adopted by Russia since the time of the Czars. Diplomacy, after the Second World War, took two apparent forms; Either extend Moscow’s hegemony by “wasta” over the “near neighbors,” as was the case with Ukraine; As is currently the case with Tajikistan, Abkhazia, and South Ossetia in the Caucasus region, or forcibly neutralizing them and preventing their accession to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), as is the case with Finland and Belarus.
Ukrainian factories provide technologies for the manufacture of Russian atomic power stations, missile complexes and other industries vital to the economies of both countries
The Russian-Ukrainian relations, as some have argued, cannot be limited to the economic factor and the expected gains and losses depending on the nature of the rapprochement or divergence between the two countries, because the organic interdependence that has been established over centuries puts Ukraine at the top of Russia’s list of priorities. One whose edges are separated by borders, barriers, and local laws. Nearly half of the population of the eastern provinces speak Russian, and they look forward to strengthening rapprochement with Moscow. The same, because Ukraine’s accession to the European Union will mean its commitment to common pacts, including adopting international and regional policies that oppose Moscow’s interests. Many are also likely that the next step will be joining NATO, which means tightening the military encirclement of Russia and deploying Western missiles directly under the windows of the Kremlin.
The Economy and the Industry
There are also irreparable losses on the economic-industrial level, as the Soviet model was distinguished by establishing substantial industrial complexes distributed in its space. After the collapse of the Soviet state, most of these giant complexes vanished, as it is no longer possible for a missile complex to continue to operate, for example, when parts of it are produced in the suburbs of Moscow and other parts Kazakhstan, Ukraine, or Belarus. The different complexes that Ukraine inherited and still constitute a significant industrial base remain linked to various industries in other countries, led by Russia. For example, Ukrainian factories provide technologies necessary for the manufacture of Russian nuclear power stations, missile complexes, and other industries vital to the economies of both countries. This means that the repercussions of Ukraine’s accession to the European Union will be significant and dangerous. At the same time, the Ukrainian market is one of the largest markets for Russian industries, which will often not be able to compete with European industries if things go according to the alarming scenario for the Russians, which means significant losses for vital sectors, which will have to search for new markets to compensate for their heavy losses.
What further complicates the situation is the size of the Russian-Ukrainian-European economic overlap. Ukrainian trade is closely linked to Russia and Europe alike. About 60% of the Ukrainian trade volume is with the countries of the former Soviet Union, and most of its industrial products come from the eastern regions of the country with industrial density. This is in addition to the personal ties that bring together many Ukrainian citizens in the eastern provinces of neighboring Russia, while for them, Europe remains very far away. Europe is still highly dependent on Russian oil and gas. The European Union is one of Russia’s foremost economic and trading partners, as its share in Russian foreign trade is about 50%. Energy resources represent the basis of these relations in general, as about 36% of the gas, 31% of the oil, and 30% of the coal imports of the European Union come from Russia. This represents 80% of its total exports of oil, 70% of its total exports of gas, and 50% of its total exports of coal, while the share of Russian machinery and equipment (investment goods) is less than 1%. Russia ranks third after the United States and China in foreign trade with the European Union, with a share equivalent to 7% of its exports and 11% of its imports. In this way, cooperation with the European Union provides significant revenue for the Russian state treasury.
Preserving the “balance of power” is a base for international relations, and NATO and its expansion and modification of its strategy and field of work is an American interest.
At the same time, 18% of petrochemical products, 10% of foodstuffs, investment, and technological equipment and machinery reach Russia about 45%. Concerning investment cooperation, 70% of foreign investments in the Russian economy go to the European Union. This reflects the organic interdependence between the Russian economy and the economy of these countries. The depth of the mutual influence between the Russian and European economies has emerged in light of the first punitive measures taken by the European Union against pro-Russian Russian and Ukrainian personalities. The crisis in 2014 and the ruble lost 11% of its value, forcing the Russian Central Bank to intervene and inject $16 billion to stabilize the currency. Investments estimated at 50 billion dollars have also been withdrawn from the Russian markets. In addition, the trade exchange between Russia and America increases to more than 40 billion dollars.
The Background of the Russian-Western Conflict
With the end of the Cold War (the Malta summit between Presidents Bush and Gorbachev in 1989) and the collapse of the Soviet Union (1991), the world witnessed a political trend that called for the liquidation of hotbeds of tension and wars and the establishment of world peace. Gorbachev calls for establishing an international order based on a “balance of interests” as its base and prioritizes international cooperation, which means the decline of the military factor and giving priority in international relations to workers, both political and economic. This climate led to the emergence of European calls for the dissolution of NATO after the end of the Cold War, the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the collapse of the Soviet Union had no meaning or purpose, and to accept Gorbachev’s call to establish a single Europe from the Urals to the Atlantic, and to resolve regional conflicts by peaceful means. And to provide a helping hand to developing countries to get them out of the state of economic collapse and ethnic and political conflicts.
The United States strongly rejected and resisted this approach. Preserving the “balance of power” is the basis of international relations, and NATO, its expansion and modification of its strategy and field of action, is an American interest. Therefore, it adopted evasive policies and pushed towards aggravating conflicts and making its parties adopt the military option. Perhaps what happened in Yugoslavia at the time is the best example of this behavior, as the Herald-Tribune revealed what was said by James Baker, US Secretary of State (May 15–16, 1992). , 1990 to Yugoslav President Milosevic: “Washington is with Yugoslavia uniting the land and the people,” and this encouraged the latter to rush into a crazy war that destroyed his country and people and led him to the war crimes court (this reminds us of the meeting of the American ambassador, April Glaspie, with Iraqi President Saddam Hussein, Before the invasion of Kuwait, and the announcement by Richard Armitage, the US Assistant Secretary of State, in Damascus in 2004 that the issue of the extension of Lebanese President Emile Lahoud is an issue to be resolved by an understanding between Syria and Lebanon).
At the fiftieth summit of the alliance in Washington in 1999, the United States worked to oblige the allies to implement its decisions, which adopted turning the association into a reference for war and peace in the world. The United States set out from a perception based on the necessity of a direct military presence in some regions around the world, especially the Middle East, Central Asia, and the Black Sea periphery, to control regional political and economic interactions and control the geostrategic map in these regions, which made the goal of NATO expansion occupy a position central to this plan.
NATO not only continued and expanded its field of action but also rushed to expand its membership by including the countries of Eastern Europe, as it had 11 Eastern European countries, including Poland and the three Baltic countries: Latvia, Estonia, and Lithuania, and proposed Ukraine’s accession to it, in addition to other countries bordering Russia such as Armenia, and getting closer and closer to the Russian border, taking advantage of Russia’s weakness, confusion, and entry into a state of weightlessness during the rule of Russian President Boris Yeltsin. The deployment of parts of the missile shield in the Czech Republic, Romania, and Turkey, and other moving parts on the back of tankers in the Baltic states, has raised Russia’s fears because it allows the United States to conduct the first strike and paralyzes Russia’s ability to respond. Kissinger, Russia is still significant, so it’s dangerous.
Russia had reservations about expansion operations because it conflicted with the understanding between the West and the Soviet Union during the negotiations for the unification of Germany. Still, Moscow, with Russian solid official statements rejecting the expansion of the alliance, consented and signed with NATO in 1997, under President Yeltsin, the “Paris Pact” which opened the door for the accession of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary to the ranks of the alliance in a first batch. During the era of Russian President Vladimir Putin, the “Rome Declaration” was signed in 2002, according to which the “Russia-NATO” Council was established, and the alliance continued to include more Eastern European countries. The architect of the Cold War, George Kennan, and the author of the theory of containment, had declared in 1999 that he opposed the idea of NATO expansion towards the east and told his colleague Thomas Friedman at the time that “expansion towards the east would be a “tragic mistake” because the enemy at that time was not Russia, but the Communist Party It was not necessary to expand NATO, because that would force Russia to return to its role as the anti-Western, and might seek to ignite a new Cold War. In addition to all of this, we have no intention of going to war because of these remote countries.”.
Russian leaders had so succumbed to expansionism that when Putin came to power, he spoke of the possibility of Russia itself joining the alliance. During Putin’s third presidency, driven by a Russian nationalist tendency to rehabilitate Russia and avenge the phase of weakness and Western contempt, Russia adopted a vision based on state power, ensuring the loyalty of the Orthodox Church and adhering to ancient cultural values. It adopted an offensive strategy to impose its prestige and regional and international roles. It worked to strengthen the Russian military presence in the former Soviet arena through military bases in Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, Belarus, Ukraine, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, and Armenia, and by strengthening the Collective Security Treaty Organization, which currently includes Russia, Belarus, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, and Armenia, and called for the formation of a customs union that consists of the countries of the Union. The former Soviet Union, under the name of the Eurasian Union, is a parallel and competing framework for the European Union. In its view, it represents an alternative world based on the rejection of Western values and based on a perception in which no country is allowed to formulate its policies and determine the frameworks of its future alone and is under complete Russian control. Benefiting from the improvement in the price of oil and gas, which enabled it to overcome the state of the trade and fiscal deficit, and turned it into a favorable situation with a large cash reserve that allowed to raise the military budget, it launched economic and military programs to rebalance its internal situation and increase its ability to move regionally and internationally. This has fueled differences with the West in general and the United States in particular. The transformations of the Arab Spring and Western behavior in Libya, and the outbreak of the Syrian revolution, came against the whims of the Kremlin to increase the heat of the confrontation in light of Moscow’s fear of losing its last stronghold in the Mediterranean. Hence, the Kremlin adopted a biased position against the Syrian regime. In an attempt to achieve two goals: protecting its interests and presence in the Mediterranean (Tartous base) and taking revenge for depriving Russia of the Libyan cake.
Moscow was not far from right when it assessed, since the end of the 1990s, that its biggest problem is in the near abroad.
This move coincided with an American administration that adopted, for internal considerations (widespread rejection of foreign wars because of the victims and the high financial cost, as the total losses of the war in Afghanistan and Iraq were estimated at eight trillion, financial imbalance, economic problems: unemployment, inflation, erosion of infrastructure) options to limit external intervention, cooperation and joint action to confront issues, and work to achieve interests in ways that cost less humanly and materially, which gave the Russian move an opportunity to score points of apparent superiority, strengthened Putin’s impetus, raised his domestic and international shares, and pushed him to raise the tone of the challenge and expand the display of muscle and the use of force against his opponents He was tempted by the absence of a direct response to work to achieve a victory over the West in Syria, by supporting the Syrian regime with reasons for survival, covering it in the media and diplomatically, and protecting it politically.
Washington responded to Russian extremism in Syria and its failure, “Geneva 2”, by failing to play the required role and putting pressure on the regime to push it to engage in serious negotiations by encouraging the Ukrainian opposition and setting a fire in Russia’s back garden.
Moscow moved against the Ukrainian and parliamentary demonstrations and the flight of its ally, the Ukrainian President, Viktor Yanukovych, with an undeclared intervention in Crimea, encouraging the Russians there to demand a referendum for self-determination, implementing the step and annexing the island to Russia under the pretext of the referendum results. The Russian reaction in Crimea came, with a tendency to play the card of protecting Russians and Russian speakers in Ukraine, to pressure Kyiv to return to the agreement concluded between Yanukovych and the opposition under the auspices of Western countries and to cancel all steps taken by the leaders of the coup against him. Against the West, to abandon its efforts to annex Ukraine to the European Union, Moscow was not far from right when it estimated, since the end of the nineties of the last century, that its most significant problem is in the near abroad, and its attempt to secure it, but it was faced with a solid Western strategic progress, which carried, in most cases, a wave of democratic transformation and dreams Associating with European unity, it found nothing but the escalation of the Russian national spirit as a basis for resisting this Western advance.
The West considered what happened in Crimea a violation of international law and saw an opportunity to include Ukraine in the European Union, draw the eastern borders of the Union, and keep Russia away from the Baltic states, Bulgaria and Romania. The annexation of Crimea to Russia angered Western countries and countries with good relations with Russia: China, Belarus, Kazakhstan, and other countries of the Soviet Union, each for its considerations. China adopted a “neutral” position, as it does not want to engage in battles. Others for many concerns, including the situation in Tibet and Taiwan. At the same time, China does not want to lose Russia due to its increasing need for energy resources to continue its economic growth. Belarus and Kazakhstan feared that Russia would do so with it in the future.
The United States and the European Union agreed on the response that they will take against the Russian move in Ukraine: support Ukraine economically and punish Russia. Economically and diplomatically. Russian economic experts have suggested that Europe, with the United States, has developed a conception of the situation in Ukraine during the next stage, and work has begun to implement it practically on the ground with the issuance of the package of sanctions taken against loyal Russian and Ukrainian figures, and some Russian banks and companies.
However, Russia’s bet on the annexation of Crimea was to constitute a step in the domino game and move the residents of the eastern provinces to demand joining Russia, based on the fact that about 3.17% of their population are Russians, and that 43–46% of the population speaks Russian, concentrated in the east, next to The Russian borders, where it is easy to support them, in which resources, wealth and production capacities are concentrated and contribute more than 70% to the Ukrainian national product, and deprive Ukraine of these resources. Russian experts have seen that the accession of Crimea may open the appetite of other regions and regions in the former Soviet arena to request accession to the Russian Federation. Russian media have highlighted that the Pridnestroviye region in the former Soviet Republic of Moldavia, where Russians make up about 30% of its population, is also demanding to join Russia. While not ruling out the possibility of an increase in such requests in the coming period, especially if we know that the number of Russians who found themselves outside Russia after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 is not small, for example, between 23 and 30% of Russians live in Kazakhstan, and Latvia about 29 %, and in Estonia about 25.5%, we are talking here about the population of Russian origin only. If we add the number of the Russian-speaking population to them, the picture becomes more complicated.
Russia escalated the situation in Ukraine by encouraging and supporting Russians and Russian speakers in the Donbas region to declare a rebellion against the central authority.
The situation did not stop there, as Russia escalated the situation in Ukraine by encouraging and supporting the Russians and Russian speakers in the Donbas region to declare a rebellion against the central authority and demand autonomy through which Russia would influence Kyiv’s decisions. This step resulted in announcing the establishment of two independent people’s republics, Lugansk and Donetsk, on May 12, 2014, after a popular referendum.
NATO leaders discussed these changes in an offensive spirit, and visions were developed to confront them by forming a rapid intervention force, described by the former NATO Secretary-General, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, with the spearhead, ready to move, per Article V of the Alliance’s Mutual Defense Treaty, to the aid of any country. From the NATO countries exposed to external aggression within days, and the establishment of semi-fixed bases in Eastern European countries (five military bases in Latvia, Lithuania, Estonia, Romania, and Poland) and the deployment of about 4,000 soldiers there, in addition to establishing a fund to support Ukraine militarily and raising the efficiency of its army, and continuing economic pressure on Russia and imposing new economic sanctions.
The Kremlin realized the danger of the alliance’s plan to increase the rapid intervention force on Russian national security, and the attempts to besiege Russia and surround it with military bases of the coalition to change its geopolitical situation and around it, and Washington continued to work to deploy the missile shield in Eastern European countries, which prompted it to announce an amendment to the military doctrine, Its basis is the reaffirmation of the rejection of the expansion of the alliance towards the Russian borders and the increase of its military presence in Eastern Europe, the refusal to deploy the missile shield, Russia’s right to use its nuclear protection, the threat to withdraw from the 1987 Treaty on Intermediate Nuclear Missiles, the rejection of Ukraine’s accession to the alliance, and the adoption of the import substitution policy In the military and civilian fields, which means an increase in military expenditures by more than what was planned, to balance the military spending of NATO and the United States.
The declared data and positions, despite the West’s deliberate move between diplomacy and military, continued to warn of tensions and violent confrontations that could last for years, the result of which depends on the extent to which the European wing is involved in the conflict, and the area to which the Kremlin adheres to what it calls the new Russia, which includes lands from the former Soviet Union inhabited by countries Russians or Russian speakers.